This study examines the costs and benefits of uniform accounting regulation in the presence of heterogeneous firms that can lobby the regulator. A commitment to uniform regulation reduces economic distortions caused by lobbying by creating a free-rider problem between lobbying firms at the cost of forcing the same treatment on heterogeneous firms. Resolving this tradeoff, an institutional commitment to uniformity is socially desirable when firms are sufficiently homogeneous or the costs of lobbying to society are large. We show that the regulatory intensity for a given firm can be increasing or decreasing in the degree of uniformity, even though uniformity always reduces lobbying. Our analysis sheds light on the determinants of standard-setting institutions and their effects on corporate governance and lobbying efforts. society are large. We show that regulatory intensity for a given …rm can be increasing or decreasing in the degree of uniformity, even though uniformity always reduces lobbying. Our analysis sheds light on the determinants of standard-setting institutions and their e¤ects on corporate governance and lobbying e¤orts.
Introduction
The question of whether to standardize disclosure regulation is a fundamental and unanswered problem in accounting research (Dye and Sunder [2001] ; Bertomeu and Cheynel [2013] ). Individualized regulation (IR) allows for tailoring accounting policies to the characteristics of each regulated …rm. Yet, for the most part, accounting rules take a uniform regulation (UR) approach in which, for example, the principles of US GAAP or IFRS are applied across di¤erent …rms and industries.
1 Common arguments in favor of UR are that investors may not understand excessive diversity in standards and that uniformity promotes comparability (e.g., Ray [2012] ). We o¤er an alternative, lesser known bene…t of uniformity.
Because …rms must lobby over the same set of rules, uniform regulations imply that each lobbyist's personally costly lobbying e¤ort bene…ts other lobbyists. Uniformity thus creates a free-rider problem between lobbyists, and greater uniformity exacerbates this free-riding problem. Hence, uniform rules are less vulnerable to political in ‡uence and serve to reduce equilibrium lobbying e¤orts and their social costs.
2
In the spirit of Peltzman [1976] and Stigler [1971] , and recently Bertomeu and Magee [2011] , we model a regulator that is in charge of disclosure regulation for multiple …rms. Each …rm faces an agency problem in that an insider (e.g., a blockholder) can take an action that bene…ts her while imposing a cost on outsiders (e.g., dispersed investors). As a motivating example, we focus on asset diversion (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny [1997] ), which is ine¢ cient because the cost to outsiders exceeds the insider's bene…t. Regulation can improve social welfare by reducing insiders'ability to divert …rm resources for their own gain.
To capture trade-o¤s between UR and IR systems, we include a cost to the regulator of 1 The current FASB chairman, Russel Golden, espoused the bene…ts of standards in recent remarks Golden [2013] , stating that "standardized …nancial reporting in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries helped develop the nation's steel manufacturing capacity."
2 In this vein, Representative John Dingell (D-MI) said in reference to the FASB: "Their job is to promulgate accounting standards of high quality that do not favor any particular industry or interest group and that maintain the credibility of our …nancial reporting system. The unparalleled success of the U.S. capital markets is due in no small part to the high quality of the …nancial reporting and accounting standards promulgated by FASB." (as quoted in Beresford [2001]) setting di¤erent regulation for di¤erent …rms. A higher cost of setting di¤erent regulation represents a more uniform regulatory environment. In our model, this cost operationalizes an institutional commitment to common standards, for example in the form of conceptual statements or the established preferences of standard-setters. Absent lobbying, the regulator chooses the intensity of regulation to minimize diversion, subject to the costs of regulation.
While expected diversion decreases in regulatory intensity, the direct costs of regulation also increase in regulatory intensity and, potentially, in regulatory heterogeneity.
In our model, insiders can lobby to weaken disclosure regulation, which enables them to misreport and divert cash. 3 We show how a commitment to uniform regulation can increase regulatory intensity and social welfare. Speci…cally, more uniform regulation reduces insiders'
incentives to lobby the regulator. As a stark example, consider a perfectly uniform regulatory system. Here, the regulator sets identical regulatory intensities for all …rms based only on aggregate rather than …rm-speci…c lobbying. Therefore, relative to individualized regulation, each insider's lobbying has a stronger e¤ect on the regulation faced by all other …rms but a weaker impact on the regulation she faces. Because lobbying is individually costly to insiders, they free-ride on each other's e¤orts. This free-rider problem, driven by regulatory uniformity, hurts insiders but bene…ts society because it reduces insiders'incentives to lobby. 4 When …rms are heterogeneous, which we capture with di¤erences in the magnitude of the diversion problem across …rms, changes in regulatory uniformity have two e¤ects. We term the …rst the convergence e¤ect. It causes the regulatory intensities for the …rms to converge because of the increased cost of heterogeneous regulation to the regulator. A …rm with a 3 Lobbying has played a central role in securities regulation -in particular in the context of accounting rules where new standards are (tacitly) approved by political bodies. For example, discussions in Coates [2007] and Gipper, Lombardi, and Skinner [2013] highlight the in ‡uence of political forces on regulation related to securities law and accounting, including political campaign contributions, the "revolving door" (see, e.g., GAO [2011] ; POGO [2011] ), public persuasion strategies (Condon [2012] ), and quid pro quo arrangements. Similarly, Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jørgensen [2009] suggests that managers lobbied against SOX to maintain insider bene…ts. 4 In a similar vein, Rodrik [1986] , suggests that industry-wide tari¤s are socially preferable to …rm-speci…c subsidies because they promote free-riding on …rms' tari¤-seeking. Although the intuition is similar, our study focuses on agency con ‡icts between investors and managers rather than problems of under-or overproduction caused by product market distortions.
higher (lower) regulatory intensity experiences a decrease (increase) in regulatory intensity.
The convergence e¤ect is welfare-reducing because it re ‡ects an increasing constraint on the regulator to target regulations at the average …rm rather than at each individual …rm's optimum. In our setting, the …rm with the larger agency problem faces more intense regulation, and the convergence e¤ect causes its regulatory intensity to decrease.
In addition to the convergence e¤ect, an increase in uniformity increases each insider's free-riding on the other's lobbying, as described above. We term this the free-riding e¤ect. In contrast to the convergence e¤ect, the free-riding e¤ect reduces the insiders'in ‡uence on the regulator and is, therefore, welfare increasing. For the …rm with the smaller agency problem, convergence and free-riding each imply a higher regulatory intensity. For the …rm with the larger agency problem, convergence reduces regulatory intensity and free-riding increases it. Which of these two e¤ects dominates depends on how problematic lobbying is in the economy. The convergence e¤ect dominates if lobbying is prohibitively costly to insiders.
In contrast, the free-riding e¤ect dominates if insiders bear relatively low personal costs for lobbying.
In an extension to our model, we consider the optimal degree of uniformity from the perspective of an ex-ante planner (e.g., a legislature) concerned with minimizing the welfare losses from diversion and the implementation costs borne by the regulator. We show that the optimal degree of regulatory uniformity from the planner's perspective decreases with …rm heterogeneity and increases with the magnitude of the agency problems related to lobbying and diversion. Additionally, allowing the degree of regulatory uniformity to be endogenously chosen by the planner changes how agency problems related to lobbying a¤ect equilibrium regulatory quality.
Within the context of our model, we …nd that regulatory uniformity reduces lobbying activities. This suggests that jurisdictions where lobbying is relatively easy should feature institutions with high uniformity (and vice-versa) . Similarly, jurisdictions with more diversity in economic activity should feature institutions with low uniformity. These predictions can be tested with inter-jurisdictional comparisons and in settings where there is a change in the degree of uniformity of standards (e.g., exchange mergers). Furthermore, public comment letters and lobbying expenditures o¤er a setting in which lobbying actions may be partly observed.
Our results speak to the bene…ts of uniform regulation in a number of settings. These include settings where regulation can be industry-speci…c or uniform across industries, where an economy either has one …nancial exchange or multiple exchanges that are regulated separately, where accounting standards are either domestic (local GAAP) or multinational (IFRS), and where the auditing environment is characterized by one auditor with a consistent set of policies or numerous auditors each with their own policies. In each of these settings, there are bene…ts to allowing entity-speci…c treatments that address …rm heterogeneity and uniform treatment that promotes free riding and thereby mitigates agency problems.
The foundation for our study is the early literature on regulatory choice in economics (e.g., Arrow [1950] ) and accounting (e.g., Demski [1973 Demski [ , 1974 ). Both streams of literature help explain observed regulatory choices by highlighting how lobbying and regulatory capture cause regulators to choose non-welfare-maximizing regulations (e.g., Stigler [1971] and Watts and Zimmerman [1978] ). Recent research in this stream of literature has examined how various institutional features (e.g., voting rules) a¤ect the interaction between special interest groups and regulators. For example, Bebchuk and Neeman [2010] investigate a model where di¤erent groups lobby the regulator over the level of investor protection in a perfectly uniform regulatory regime. Similar to our analysis, Bebchuk and Neeman [2010] assume that regulation helps to reduce rent seeking activities by insiders. The model in Chung [1999] features managerial lobbying over accounting regulation, allowing for free riding but focusing on issues related to whether outsiders can observe managers' lobbying. In Bertomeu and Magee [2014] , regulatory outcomes are chosen by a combination of a majoritarian vote by …rms and the standard setter's bliss point. There, political pressure need not result in the investors' preferred regulation but, instead, can lead to cycles of increased regulation and sudden deregulation. Finally, Perotti and Volpin [2008] predict that political accountability of the regulator and investor protections are positively associated. To our knowledge, our study is the …rst to formally capture the e¤ects of uniformity in a model centered on agency con ‡icts and lobbying.
On the topic of uniform versus individualized standard-setting, Sunder [1988] broadly discusses the economics and mechanisms of standardization, and Gao, Wu, and Zimmerman [2009] highlight the compliance costs imposed on heterogeneous …rms by the one-size-…ts-all Sarbanes-Oxley Act. One way to impose individualized regulation is to allow …rms to choose from a set of multiple standards devised by competing standard-setters. Mahoney [1997] and Kahan [1997] discuss arguments for and against federal securities regulation as opposed to exchanges that compete for listings and volume by using di¤erent regulatory policies.
Similarly, Dye and Sunder [2001] examine arguments for and against allowing US …rms to choose whether to report following US GAAP or IFRS, and Bertomeu and Cheynel [2013] show that …rms' market values can be higher when they can choose between competing reporting standards. Ray [2012] models a setting in which individualized regulation is costly because it forces outsiders and regulators to adjust to di¤erent types of regulation, leading to an otherwise avoidable multiplication of costly e¤orts. Our model shows instead that uniform standards can reduce harmful lobbying by inducing a free-rider problem between lobbyists.
In our model, disclosure is used as a regulatory solution to the problem of managerial diversion. Several studies have examined disclosure's e¤ect on diversion in settings that abstract from regulatory choices and focus on …rm-level governance. In Gao [2013] and Caskey and Laux [2015] , for example, better disclosures reduce a manager's ability to divert through privately bene…cial overinvestment. In Beyer, Guttman, and Marinovic [2014] , a manager can manipulate the disclosure on which his compensation is based, providing a contractual connection between disclosure quality and the ability to divert. Armstrong, Guay, and Weber [2010] provide an empirically-oriented review of the interaction between disclosure and corporate governance. Our study contributes to this literature by showing that the commitment to uniform disclosure regulation can help to alleviate the diversion problem. Another strand of literature examines optimal standard setting in which the objective is to maximize social welfare. This literature abstracts away from frictions in the regulatory process such as lobbying. Friedman, Hughes, and Saouma [2016] , for example, examine costs and bene…ts of mandated reporting biases (e.g., conservatism) in an oligopolist product market and suggest that biased reporting is warranted because it has positive welfare implications. Chen, Hemmer, and Zhang [2007] show that certain disclosure properties can improve risk sharing. Gao, Sapra, and Xue [2016] show that, to reduce the extent of manipulative behavior, optimal regulation entails a mixture of principals-and rules-based standards. Our study focuses on a political friction, lobbying, that in ‡uences regulatory choice.
2 The model
Model setup
We develop a model of political in ‡uence and investor protection in a capital market, similar in spirit to Bebchuk and Neeman [2010] . We begin with a baseline model that features a con ‡ict between …rm insiders and outsiders that potentially di¤ers across …rms, a regulator who can help mitigate the con ‡icts, and the ability for insiders to in ‡uence the regulator.
There are two …rms, denoted by i 2 f1; 2g, and a regulatory agency. The two …rms could also be interpreted as two lobbies, each representing a set of di¤erent …rms.
5 Firms are composed of risk-neutral insiders and outsiders and there exists an agency problem between these two parties. This con ‡ict is representative of con ‡icts between managers and shareholders, shareholders and debtholders, or blockholders and dispersed owners, for example. While outsiders have a claim on the assets or cash ‡ows of the …rm, insiders have an opportunity to pursue private bene…ts, for example, through diversion of funds or 5 We take the two …rms (or lobbies) as given, consistent with Grossman and Helpman [1994] .
consumption of perks and slack. 6 To …x language, we will refer to the personally bene…cial action that the insider takes as diversion.
Speci…cally, when the insider diverts funds, she gains D i > 0, but this imposes a cost on outsiders of We introduce q 2 [0; 1) to parameterize …rm heterogeneity. Speci…cally,
and D 2 = D (1 + q), such that D is the average potential diversion in the economy. If q = 0, the …rms are homogeneous. For q > 0, …rm 2 faces a larger potential diversion problem than …rm 1, since D 2 > D 1 . For ease of exposition, we refer below to …rm 2 as the bad …rm and …rm one as the good …rm because …rm 2 has a (weakly) more severe diversion problem.
Regulation limits the insider's opportunity to divert by requiring the disclosure of asset values or cash ‡ow realizations. Empirically, for example, Perotti and Volpin [2008] use accounting standards as a measure of investor protection, consistent with standards helping protect investors from expropriation. Formally, if the insider is forced to truthfully disclose 6 Albuquerue and Wang [2008] assumes that insiders "steal" cash ‡ows at a personal cost. Shleifer and Vishny [1997] and [2000] discuss managerial diversion and expropriation of value from investors, noting their close relation to agency problems and perquisite consumption as outlined in Jensen and Meckling [1976] . Schipper [1981] provides an early explicit reference to asset diversion by highlighting how insiders "maximize their own wealth by diverting …rm assets to their private use" (p. 87).
7 Firms in our model are heterogeneous in the size of the potential diversion, although they are homogeneous in the proportional costs of diversion, 1 + . 8 We assume the cost, A i is borne only by the outsiders. 9 We require only that cash ‡ows are su¢ ciently random to preclude a contract that forces the insider not to divert. Technically, our assumptions imply that cash ‡ows to outsiders have non-moving support. In an earlier version of this paper, we relaxed assumption (iii) and showed that contracting on cash ‡ows allows the outsiders to mitigate (and for some parameterizations, eliminate) the problems related to diversion and lobbying.
cash ‡owsx i , then she will not have the opportunity to divert A i , consume D i , and misreport net cash ‡ows ofx i A i to outsiders. Speci…cally, we model the intensity of regulation governing each …rm i as the probability i that an insider is unable to divert. 10 The insider can misreport and expropriate value from outsiders with probability (1 i ).
11
Finally, before the regulator speci…es the regulatory intensities, each insider can exert e¤ort B i to lobby the regulator to relax the regulatory intensity for his …rm. In the model, neither outsiders nor insiders can form lobbying groups of any kind. This is consistent with, for instance, small, disorganized, competitive investors and disparate …rms. Insiders and outsiders also cannot contract on the type of lobbying activity we model, nor can insiders commit ex ante not to lobby ex post. The inability to contract or commit on this dimension of in ‡uence seems plausible, as, for example, it would be di¢ cult for arms-length investors to determine what exact policies managers were promoting in private meetings with regulators,
i.e., whether managers were pursuing bene…cial trade protections or harmful regulatory slack. Table 1 shows the timeline. Insiders incur a personal cost of lobbying the regulator,
i . We interpret the parameter 10 For instance, a higher i could represent a regulator's more stringent interpretation of existing regulation (e.g., the SEC's interpretations of the Dodd-Frank Act) or legislative actions that adjust existing rules (e.g., the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments). As modeled, i also encompasses enforcement, which can have a signi…cant in ‡uence on regulatory e¢ cacy (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz [2013] ).
11 Note that regulation leads to an ex ante probability of truthful disclosure. This is similar to Bertomeu and Magee [2015] , where …rms have to reveal all signals below a threshold and withhold all signals above the threshold, meaning that higher regulatory thresholds increase the ex ante probability of truthful disclosure because more signal realizations will be disclosed. In our model, an insider has to disclose the …rm's cash ‡ows truthfully with probability i , independent of the realization of cash ‡ows. With probability 1 i , insiders can manipulate the report, claim that the cash ‡ows were lower, and divert the di¤erence. c > 0 as re ‡ecting the ability of outsiders to e¤ectively monitor and deter insiders'lobbying.
A higher value of c re ‡ects a less severe insider-outsider agency problem on lobbying that facilitates the subsequent diversion problem. Each insider's expected utility is given by
With probability (1 i ), the insider is able to take the personally bene…cial action and consume D i . Insiders always bear the cost of lobbying because they lobby the regulator before potential diversion occurs. Outsiders receive (unmodeled) payments net of the (modeled) costs of insider diversion. The collective expected utility of outsiders in …rm i, which is also equal to the value of the outsiders'claim, is given by
The timeline above implies that when the regulator decides on the regulatory intensity at t = 2, the costs of lobbying,
i , are sunk. The regulator in ‡uences aggregate utility by using regulation to reduce the expected losses from diversion:
The welfare-interested regulator is only concerned about diversion because of the welfare loss, D i , that it imposes on society. 12 This welfare loss occurs with probability (1 i ),
for each …rm i. The regulator wants to minimize this welfare loss subject to the costs of regulation.
13
12 Note that this implies that the regulator would optimally allow insiders to divert when = 0. In a more general model, allowing insiders to divert could reduce outsiders'ex ante investment incentives, leading to a welfare-destroying under-investment problem.
13 Note that c, , and i all capture facets of the regulatory and enforcement environment. We believe the most direct interpretations of these variables are as follows. First, c captures regulatory corruption and outsiders'ability to limit insiders'wasteful activities (as c parameterizes the personal cost to the insider of lobbying in the model). Second, relates to the protection of property rights (as parameterizes the loss of resources conditional on diversion). Finally, i relates closely to disclosure quality and protections against self-dealing (as i parameterizes the probability that a insider will be able to divert resources, potentially by misreporting …nancial results; see also Djankov et al. [2008] ). In our model, i is endogenous, while c and are exogenous because we view corruption and property rights protections to be deeper institutional parameters than rules and enforcement actions related to disclosure quality and self-dealing.
We model three costs associated with regulation. First, we assume a convex cost of regulation in and of itself, ( 1 2 ) 2 , as heterogeneous regulation plausibly requires greater care in drafting regulation and increased expenditures in enforcement (e.g., sta¤ costs).
When k = 0, the regulator is free to choose individualized regulation without incurring any penalty (IR). As k ! 1, the regulator will set the same regulatory intensity for both …rms, thereby choosing a one-size-…ts-all regime (UR). Note that k can be interpreted as a technical constraint on the regulator or an institutional commitment (for example, a mission statement) to regulate di¤erent …rms in a similar fashion. To capture these alternatives, we …rst model the cost parameter k as exogenous and in Section 3 consider an ex-ante planner (e.g., a legislative body) that chooses k to minimize the welfare losses and implementation costs.
Thus, the total cost of regulation is given by
and the regulator's expected utility is
That is, the regulator chooses the regulatory intensity for both …rms to minimize the expected losses from diversion net of the cost of regulation.
The equilibrium
We examine the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium de…ned as follows. In period 2, the regulator chooses optimal regulatory intensities, f 1 ; 2 g to maximize its objective function in (4), given fB 1 ; B 2 g. In period 1, each insider i chooses B i to maximize her expected utility in (1) given rational conjectures about the regulator's strategy in period 2 and the other insider's conjectured optimal choice of B j .
We solve the equilibrium by backward induction. We begin in period 2, when the regulator chooses the regulatory intensities. We impose the following two conditions to ensure interior solutions. The regulator's expected utility is concave and has the following …rst-order conditions:
for i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6 = j. The equations in (5) imply
Note that both @ i =@B i and @ i =@B j are negative, so that more lobbying from either insider reduces the regulatory intensity for both …rms for any k > 0. Higher values of k, i.e., greater uniformity, imply that an insider's lobbying has a lower e¤ect on the regulatory intensity his …rm faces, since @ 2 i =(@k@B i ) = (1 + 2k) 2 > 0. This mitigates the negative e¤ect of B i on i . In contrast, the in ‡uence of insider i's lobbying on the regulatory intensity of …rm j is increasing in k, since @ 2 i =(@k@B j ) = (1 + 2k) 2 < 0. In our model, k captures the cost to the regulator of setting di¤erent regulatory strengths for the two …rms. Intuitively, higher values of k imply that the regulator chooses more similar regulatory intensities for the two …rms, so that one …rm's lobbying has a greater spillover e¤ect on the regulatory intensity of the other …rm, making the negative e¤ect of B j on i stronger.
Given the anticipated choice of the regulator, insiders choose their in ‡uence activities to maximize U i in (1). Substituting i into U i and taking the derivative yields the …rst-order conditions. Solving the …rst-order conditions 14 implies that the optimal B i are given by
This shows that higher personal bene…ts of misbehavior, D i , are associated with higher lobbying e¤orts from insiders, B i . Furthermore, note that an increase in k decreases both insiders' lobbying e¤orts,
2 , which is due to the e¤ect that an increase in k has on the regulator's response to lobbying e¤orts.
The equilibrium in terms of exogenous parameters is shown in the following proposition, which follows straightforwardly from substituting B i from (7) into (6) and solving these two equations for 1 and 2 . All proofs can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1 There is a unique interior equilibrium with i 2 (0; 1) for i 2 f1; 2g de…ned 1 + 2k + q 1 + 2k ,
, and
To understand the characteristics of the equilibrium, it is helpful to investigate the equilibrium regulatory intensities. Note that equation (6) implies that two factors in ‡uence a …rm's regulatory intensity: potential losses from diversion and insiders'lobbying e¤orts.
More speci…cally, denoting ! = 1 1+2k
, …rm i's regulatory intensity is a weighted average of …rm i's potential loss from diversion and lobbying e¤ort and the average potential loss from diversion and lobbying e¤ort:
B i is de…ned in equation (7) The expression for i in equation (8) illustrates three important forces in our model.
First, as lobbying becomes prohibitively costly to insiders, i.e., c ! 1, insiders cease lobbying. Absent lobbying, the regulator sets the optimal regulatory strength for …rm i as a weighted average of only the expected loss from diversion for the target …rm (with deadweight loss D i ) and the expected loss from diversion for the "average …rm"(with deadweight loss
Second, the degree of uniformity, k, in ‡uences the weights on …rm-speci…c and average factors in (8), as ! = 1 1+2k
. Increases in regulatory uniformity increase the regulator's weight on D and B in equation (8) relative to the weight on D i and B i . Uniformity thus pushes regulatory qualities toward each other. We call this the convergence e¤ect of regulatory uniformity. Naturally, the convergence e¤ect pushes the higher (lower) regulatory intensity down (up). If …rms are homogeneous, i.e., q = 0, then D 1 = D 2 = D, and the convergence e¤ect is trivial. Absent lobbying (i.e., as c ! 1), 2 decreases and 1 increases with an increase in k for any q > 0. When …rms are homogeneous and cannot lobby, regulatory uniformity, k, plays no role in our model. Third, as discussed above, there is an additional e¤ect of regulatory uniformity on each …rm's regulatory intensity, via @B i =@k < 0 and @ B =@k < 0. This is the free-rider e¤ect in our model. It reduces both insiders' lobbying e¤orts and thereby increases both …rms' regulatory intensities, since B i and B both enter negatively in (8).
Equilibrium characteristics
Corollaries 1-3 present our comparative statics results for the baseline model. Corollary 1 summarizes the e¤ects of changes in the cost of lobbying and the e¢ ciency of diversion.
Corollary 1 Lobbying and the deadweight loss from diversion (a) As the cost of lobbying, c, increases, (i) the lobbying e¤orts of both insiders decrease and (ii) the regulatory intensities for both …rms increase.
(b) As the proportional deadweight loss from diversion, , increases, (i) the lobbying e¤orts of both insiders are unchanged and (ii) the regulatory intensities for both …rms increase.
Corollary 1 shows that insiders lobby less when their costs of lobbying increase, but their lobbying e¤orts do not respond directly to the costs their diversion imposes on outsiders.
When insiders lobby less, regulatory intensities increase, and, as a result, the expected value of the future payouts to investors increases. Note that a change in c only has a direct e¤ect on the insiders; regulatory intensities are only a¤ected indirectly. Changes in , however, only have a direct e¤ect on regulatory intensities, an e¤ect which operates through the regulator's preferences for lower ine¢ ciency regardless of lobbying e¤orts. When increases, the regulator is more interested in high regulatory intensity because the deadweight loss from diversion decreases.
Corollary 2 analyzes the e¤ects of increases in …rm heterogeneity and the average potential diversion from the …rms, both of which are operationalized by the amounts that insiders can divert, D 1 and D 2 . Speci…cally, recall that
and heterogeneity is given by q =
.
Corollary 2 Firm heterogeneity and average potential diversion (a) As …rms become more heterogeneous (i.e., q increases), (i) the lobbying e¤ort of the the bad …rm's insider and the regulatory intensity for the bad …rm increase; (ii) the lobbying e¤ort of the good …rm's insider and the regulatory intensity for the good …rm decrease; and (iii) total lobbying is unchanged.
(b) As average potential diversion, D, increases, (i) both insiders lobby the regulator more, and (ii) the regulatory intensities for both …rms increase.
Corollary 2 (a) analyzes the e¤ect of increased heterogeneity between …rms. First note that an increase in heterogeneity implies that for …rm 2 (1) there is more (less) cash for the insider to divert and a higher (lower) potential deadweight loss that the regulator would like to prevent. While the resulting increase in lobbying e¤ort from …rm 2's insider acts to decrease …rm 2's regulatory intensity, the increased deadweight loss acts to increase 2 . The latter e¤ect dominates the former such that …rm 2's regulatory intensity increases despite the increased lobbying e¤ort from …rm 2's insider. The opposite occurs for …rm 1, which becomes less important to the regulator and whose smaller amount of diversion provides a weaker motivation to the insider to lobby. The e¤ects of heterogeneity on each …rm's lobbying are equal and opposite, implying no net e¤ect of heterogeneity on total lobbying.
Part (b) shows that with an increase in average potential diversion in the economy, both insiders have more resources available to divert, and thus increase their lobbying e¤orts.
However, since the potential deadweight loss also increases, the regulator is interested in higher regulatory intensities and, despite the increased lobbying, increases 1 and 2 . If the potential for diversion D increases in the …rms'realized or expected cash ‡ows, our model suggests greater lobbying in macroeconomic expansions than contractions, in contrast to the prediction in Bertomeu and Magee [2011] .
Finally, we analyze the e¤ect of a change in k, which represents the degree of UR relative to IR. Denote c = Corollary 3 Degree of uniformity: As the cost to the regulator of individualized regulation, k, increases, (i) the lobbying e¤orts of both insiders decrease; (ii) the regulatory intensity for the good …rm increases; (iii) the regulatory intensity for the bad …rm decreases for c > c, …rst increases then decreases for c > c > c, and always increases for c < c; and (iv) the average regulatory intensity increases.
As discussed in the introduction, constraining the regulator to set similar regulatory intensities for di¤erent …rms introduces two e¤ects, the convergence e¤ect and the free-rider e¤ect.
The convergence e¤ect arises because an increase in k makes the regulator more inclined to apply the same regulatory intensity to both …rms. Therefore, 1 and 2 are set closer to each other in equilibrium. This e¤ect pushes the higher 2 down and the lower 1 up. The free-rider e¤ect occurs because, when the regulator chooses more similar values for 1 and 2 , the lobbying e¤orts of …rm i's insider have a stronger e¤ect on the regulatory intensity of …rm j. This leads to a more intense free-rider problem on insiders'lobbying in that each insider relies more on the other insider's lobbying e¤orts to economize on his own e¤orts.
Insiders therefore reduce their overall lobbying e¤orts, which increases i for both …rms.
The net e¤ects of an increase in k on insiders'lobbying are unambiguous. So, too, are the net e¤ects of an increase in k on regulatory intensity for the good …rm, as the convergence and free-rider e¤ects both act to increase 1 . However, the net e¤ects of the convergence and freerider e¤ects on regulatory strengths for the bad …rm are ambiguous. For 2 , the convergence and free-rider e¤ects oppose each other, and either may dominate, yielding implications for 2 that depend on parameter values. When the agency problem is su¢ ciently severe (c < c), such that both …rms heavily lobby the regulator, the free-rider e¤ect dominates, 15 When q = 0, we set cj q=0 = lim q!0 c = 1 and cj q=0 = lim q!0 c = 1.
causing 2 to be increasing in k. When the agency problem is su¢ ciently mild (c > c), the convergence e¤ect dominates, causing 2 to be decreasing in k. Finally, when the agency problem has intermediate strength ( c > c > c), the free-riding e¤ect dominates for low values of k, such that d 2 =dk > 0, but the convergence e¤ect dominates for high values of k, such that d 2 =dk < 0. 16 Ultimately, when k approaches in…nity, the regulator sets 1 = 2 , irrespective of c. Overall, the free-rider e¤ect and the convergence e¤ect complement each other for the …rm with the lower regulatory intensity and con ‡ict with each other for the …rm with the higher regulatory intensity. Given that lobbying for both …rms decreases, the average regulatory intensity increases.
The parameter k re ‡ects the extent to which the regulator is bound to apply the same regulatory intensity to both …rms. As capital market equilibria and the regulatory system likely evolve together, we next analyze the e¤ect of allowing k to be chosen by an ex-ante planner concerned with minimizing the welfare losses from diversion and the implementation costs of regulation.
The optimal regulatory system
In this section we examine the optimal choice of balance between uniform and individualized regulation, i.e., the choice of k, from the perspective of an ex-ante planner concerned with the welfare loss from diversion and the implementation costs of regulation. We interpret k as a deep institutional parameter that is set for the long run (or ex ante) and is not subject to lobbying in ‡uence.
We assume that the planner is interested in minimizing the loss from diversion subject to the costs of implementation. 17 While considering implementation costs, we assume that the 1 . 17 This is similar to maximizing outsiders'expected utility net of the regulator's implementation costs. In a competitive stock market where the outsiders represent marginal investors, the outsider's expected utility, i (1 i ) (1 + ) D i , would be closely related to the stock price. This suggests an interpretation of the planner as an exchange choosing its degree of uniformity to maximize market capitalization net of regulatory implementation costs. planner does not consider the direct costs she imposes on the regulator through her choice of k, which are (k=2) ( 1 2 ) 2 , or the costs that managers personally bear for socially undesirable lobbying, which are (c=2) B 2 1 + (c=2) B 2 2 .
18
The planner's objective function is given by
Recall from Proposition 1 that 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 requires Condition 1 to hold, i.e., > 1 c 1+k 1+2k
. We therefore restrict our attention to > 1 c such that the regulator will choose positive 1 and 2 for any k 2 [0; 1), chosen by the planner. The solution is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When q 2 (2c 1) 1 0, the planner chooses a perfectly uniform regulatory system, k y ! 1. When q 2 (2c 1) 1 > 0, the planner chooses
The threshold in Proposition 2 is related to the importance of regulatory uniformity in improving regulatory intensities and to the cost imposed by uniform regulation. Because the economic forces that drive the decision to choose a perfectly uniform system (k y ! 1) are the same forces that lead to an increase in k y , we focus our discussion on the comparative statics presented in the following corollary.
Corollary 4 The optimal degree of uniformity from the planner's perspective, k y , (i) weakly decreases in insiders' personal costs of lobbying, c; (ii) weakly decreases in the deadweight loss from insiders' diversion, ; (iii) is independent of mean …rm size, D; and (iv) weakly decreases in the degree of …rm heterogeneity, q.
Corollary 4 shows that it is more valuable to constrain the extent to which the regulator can individualize regulation when lobbying-related agency problems are severe (low c), …rms are similar (low q), or managerial diversion is e¢ cient (low ). Furthermore, these comparative statics are monotone over the whole parameter range. For example, starting at a high c, decreases in c …rst continuously increase k y . As c decreases further and q 2 (2c 1) 1 ! 0 from above, the optimal regulatory system approaches perfect uniformity, i.e., k y ! 1. The …rst two results in the corollary directly point to our two main economic forces: while freeriding on lobbying reduces the impact of the agency problem and makes UR more preferable, …rm heterogeneity makes regulatory heterogeneity and IR more preferable. The third result is similar in that low values of push the potential welfare losses from diversion in either …rm towards zero and thus towards each other, implying similar results to low heterogeneity driven by low q. Mean …rm size, D, does not a¤ect the optimal k y , as it is a scaling factor in the planner and regulator's utilities given equilibrium lobbying e¤orts.
The following corollary explores how the equilibrium regulatory strengths, (ii) total lobbying, B y 1 + B y 2 , is decreasing in lobbying costs, c, and increasing in …rm heterogeneity, q, potential diversion, D, and the welfare loss from diversion, .
(iii) the regulatory intensity for (a) …rm 1, y 1 , decreases in lobbying costs, c; and …rm heterogeneity, q; (b) …rm 2, y 2 , increases in lobbying costs, c; and …rm heterogeneity, q; and (c) for both …rms increase in potential diversion, D; and the welfare loss from diversion, .
When k y is endogenously chosen by the planner, any change in an exogenous parameter a¤ects regulatory strength and lobbying e¤orts through two channels. First, they have direct e¤ects as indicated in the corollaries in Section 2.3. Second, they have indirect e¤ects on regulatory strength and lobbying e¤orts through their e¤ects on k y . Taking lobbying costs as a representative example, an increase in c directly decreases both insiders'lobbying e¤orts and increases both …rms' regulatory intensities. However, the optimal k y decreases when c increases, as lobbying becomes less problematic. The less uniform regulatory system allows the regulator to respond more strongly to the individual characteristics of each …rm.
Even though both lobbying e¤orts decrease, the e¤ect of a reduced k y dominates such that (ii) of Corollary 5, total lobbying always increases with …rm heterogeneity, q, and the welfare loss from diversion, . In contrast, when uniformity is exogenous, q and have no net e¤ects on total lobbying. Speci…cally, when k is exogenous, has no direct e¤ect on either …rm's lobbying, and the e¤ects of changes in heterogeneity on B 1 and B 2 exactly cancel each other out. When, instead, k is endogenous, increases in q and decrease k y , which causes total lobbying to increase.
Finally, Corollary 4 shows that changes in D have no e¤ect of k y , this implies that the results from the setting with an exogenous k are unchanged. However, while lobbying e¤orts were constant in with a constant degree of uniformity, an increase in lowers k y such that both insiders'lobbying e¤orts increase in when k is chosen endogenously by the planner as k y . Table 2 lists the comparative statics for the baseline model and the extension with an endogenous k y . 
Conclusion
Disclosure regulation and interactions between …rms or sectors of the economy both have signi…cant impacts on capital markets. We investigate the e¤ects of uniform (i.e., one-size…ts-all) versus individualized (i.e., …rm-or industry-speci…c) regulation in a model where insiders can lobby the regulatory agency for favorable regulation. Each …rm is composed of an insider who can divert cash ‡ows, where such diversion imposes an ine¢ cient cost on the …rm's outsiders. The regulator is charged with limiting the ability of the insiders to divert.
While the regulator is concerned about the welfare e¤ects of regulatory intensity, he can be in ‡uenced by insiders'lobbying.
Our main …nding is that a regime with uniform regulation (UR) can enhance welfare by exacerbating a free-rider problem among insiders who can lobby the regulator for privately bene…cial but socially harmful regulatory slack. When …rms are not too heterogeneous, this e¤ect makes UR preferable to individualized regulation (IR). When …rms are very di¤erent, however, the bene…t of UR in reducing lobbying is outweighed by the costs of setting similar regulatory intensities for heterogeneous …rms.
Through analysis of the model, we provide several empirical implications, which we hope will be helpful in understanding the e¤ects of the regulatory regime on lobbying and the quality of disclosure regulation. For example, we predict that regulatory regimes will tend towards uniformity when agency problems between investors and managers are more severe or when it is less costly for insiders to lobby the regulator.
Our model suggests that lobbying could be more di¢ cult when regulatory standards are principles-based and apply broadly (even across jurisdictions) as under IFRS, than when regulatory standards are rules-based and can be tailored …rms' and industries' particular circumstances, as under US GAAP (Herz [2003] ). In line with this interpretation, the IASB might be in e¤ect more immune to political pressure, as suggested by Canham [2009] . Ze¤ [2002] observes that Swiss CFOs displayed a preference for US GAAP over IFRS in part due to preparers'ability to in ‡uence regulatory standards in the U.S. Our comparison of rulesbased GAAP and principles-based IFRS suggests that jurisdictions characterized by weaker agency problems between insiders and outsiders might be more likely to delay or avoid transitions from GAAP to IFRS, while jurisdictions with signi…cant agency problems would seek out commitments to regulatory uniformity. This may have been one of several reasons for the delays in US convergence to IFRS, and might also contribute to other countries' delays in adopting IFRS.
Similarly, some of the divergence between code and common law legal systems (see, e.g., La Porta et al. [2000] ) could relate to uniformity in de facto regulations. In common-law jurisdictions, judicial rulings establish precedents that apply relatively uniformly, while in code law systems precedents are not established by judicial rulings. This implies that there is greater de facto uniformity in common-law jurisdictions, which is consistent with the stronger legal protections of outside investors and enforcement of these rules in common law countries relative to code law countries (e.g., La Porta et al. [1998] ).
We generate results in a setting with a single regulator who is potentially constrained to set uniform regulation. The intuition easily extends to related institutional design problems, including whether to have a single or multiple accounting standard-setters and the e¤ects of auditor and …nancial exchange mergers. 19 In the US, for example, there have been arguments and movements both in favor of UR, through merging the FASB and IASB or standards convergence, and in favor of IR, through allowing …rms to choose to report under US GAAP or IFRS. Our results imply that changes in regulatory uniformity have implications for lobbying and regulatory intensity. Di¤erent auditors or …nancial exchanges can have di¤erent policies regarding disclosure, suggesting that mergers of auditing …rms can also be seen as movements towards uniformity. Mergers of auditors and exchanges can help reduce managerial in ‡uence over their disclosure policies, which we show can be bene…cial overall.
Proposition 1: The solution to our game is given by the values of four unknowns, B i and i for i 2 f1; 2g, that solve a constrained system of four linear equations: either the four FOC's, (7) and (6); or corner solutions replacing any of the FOCs, such as B i = 0, i = 0,
from (7) into (6) yields
Since 1 < 2 implies that 2 < 1 ) 1 < 1, we have an interior equilibrium, i.e., i 2 (0; 1), if and only if
, which ensures i > 0 for i 2 f1; 2g , and
< 1, which ensures 2 < 1.
The …rst inequality, c > 
For Corollary 3, part (iv), the average regulatory intensity is given by
, and the derivative is given by 
where the …rst inequality follows from Condition 1. For Corollary 3, part (iii), the derivative of 2 with respect to k can be written as
The derivative is always negative when That is, @ 2 @k < 0 when c is su¢ ciently large. The above derivative is positive when
The term in parentheses ranges from Proposition 2: To prove the Proposition, we (I) establish the …rst-order condition, which (II) has three solutions. We then rule out two of the three by showing that (III) one of the solutions is a local minimum, and (IV) another is negative for feasible parameter values. We (V) establish a condition for the third solution to be a global maximum. Finally, we (VI) show that if the condition is violated, the optimum is a corner solution with k y ! 1.
I.
Substituting expressions for i and B i from (6) and (7) into U S in (9) yields,
and maximizing U S with respect to k gives the following FOC:
2 + q 2 ( 2 + 4c ) , and
2 + q 2 ( 2 + 4c ) .
III.
It is straightforward to show that k < 0 for the relevant values of c, q, and (i.e., c > 0, > 0, and 0 q 1).
IV. k 0 > 0 if and only if 1 < 2c 2, but in this range, the SOC,
is violated, implying that k 0 , if it is a feasible critical point, gives a local minimum. Further-
dk 2 j k=k + < 0, and is satis…ed for parameters that satisfy q 2 +1 < 2c . Therefore, we require the restriction that q 2 +1 < 2c , which cannot be satis…ed as q ! 0. Given this restriction, k y = k + .
VI. When q 2 + 1 > 2c , we do not have an interior solution. We compare lim k!0 U S and lim k!1 U S to determine whether the planner will in this case set a perfectly uniform or individualized system. We have
Comparing these, we have
It is algebraically straightforward but tedious to verify that U S S j k=k + is greater than lim k!0 U S and lim k!1 U S when 2c > q 2 + 1. So, we next combine the condition in (14) with the condition for not having an interior maximum, q 2 + 1 > 2c , which is equivalent to
. For existence of such a q, we require
but (15) . So, there is no feasible q that satis…es both conditions, which implies that lim k!0 U S < lim k!1 U S for all relevant parameter values and the planner chooses
Corollary 4: The derivatives are given by
Corollary 5: The comparative statics follow from applying the chain rule using the results from Corollaries 1-4. When applying the chain rule below, we use the following identities:
for X 2 fB i ; i g i=1;2 and Y 2 fc; ; q; Dg ; and
To facilitate the following computations, we begin by deriving expressions for First, substituting k y and rearranging terms yields:
A , and (17)
Second, using k y from equation (10) 
In what follows we …rst derive the comparative statics for B 1 and B 2 (numbered items 1-6),
for B 1 + B 2 (item 7), and then for 1 and 2 (items 8-14).
1.
Using the chain rule and (19) yields
where
The inequality, dB y 1 dc < 0, holds because, …rst, for k = k y (i.e., when the optimal k is …nite), it has to be the case that q 2 + 1 < 2c , which implies that (q 2 (2c 1) 1) > 0. Second, for the denominator of A 1 :
Third, the numerator of A 1 is given by
The …rst term, (q 2 (2c 1) 1) qc + q 2 (1 + q 2 ) + q 2 (1 c ) 2 , is negative by our assumption that q 2 +1 > 2c . The second term, 2q 2 qc 2
is also negative, as qc 2
So, the numerator of A 1 is negative and the denominator is positive. As the leading fraction in (21),
, is positive,
: Using the chain rule and (19) yields
The expression in (22) 
The leading fraction,
, is positive, and A 2 is positive (negative) for q = 1=4, c = 1, and = 19 ( = 32). We …rst show that the derivative of each part with respect to y is positive when q > 1=2, which implies that the derivative of ty with respect to y is positive when q > 1=2. This further implies that ty is minimized when y approaches its lower bound. We then show that the minimum of ty is positive, which implies that ty is positive everywhere. That is, …rst, dty BCD dty = q 2 y (2q 1) 2 + 4q 2 + 4 + qy + 4q 2 y
4.

2
(1 q + 4qy) p 2 + q 2 (2 + y 2 ) p 2 + q 2 (2 + y 2 ) and this term is positive for q > 1=2, as That is, ty > 0 holds everywhere. Therefore, 
The condition in (24) is implied by the condition for interior k y , q 2 (2c 1) 1, and 0 < q < 1, as q (2c 1) 1 > q 2 (2c 1) 1.
Therefore, q 2 (2c 1) 1 ) q (2c 1) 1 ) 12. Next, de…ne c = y + 1, and y as after substituting y for c 1: y = yq p 2 + q 2 (2 + y 2 ) 2 + yq (1 q) + 3 (1 q) p 2 + q 2 (2 + y 2 ).
which is the sum of three positive terms, given y > 0 and 0 < q < 1. Finally,
14. 
